Abstract
Introduction
The European Union (EU) finances have been much criticized by the political economy literature. They are considered an inappropriate tool for fostering common goals (Micossi and Gros, 2006; Buti and Nava, 2003) , unable to expand the provision of public goods in new areas of integration, such as internal and external security or foreign policy (Tabellini, 2003) . The accompanying decision-making procedures have equally been subject to criticism, as they are too long and complicated and as they have been repeatedly the occasion for serious interinstitutional conflicts between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
The recent institutional reform wave in the EU (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) The analysis discusses first the formal design of the current budgetary procedure, whose importance is often neglected. As a matter of fact, it represented the first real involvement of the Parliament in the EU decision-making processes and it traced a path for the development of interinstitutional relationships in other decision-making processes, codecision included. The paper aims, in particular, at a reconstruction of the link between the formal design of the procedure and the difficulties of its operational functioning, which finally required formal changes of the rules and the enactment of informal institutions.
With the budgetary procedure the Parliament was first given an effective role in the EU decision-making. The design of the budgetary procedure preceded both the decision to elect the Parliament's members by universal direct voting in 1976 and the upgrading of its legislative power, which started with the Single European Act and the cooperation procedure in 1987. However, when put into practice, the budgetary procedure produced many interinstitutional difficulties and periods of prolonged conflicts. The literature 1 ascribes them to a host of factors: the Parliament's and Council's preferences for integration, their degree of impatience, the absence of formal rules for solving conflicts, the indeterminacy of some Treaty provisions. To these reasons we add and discuss the fact that the procedure was designed as a non-cooperative alternating offers bargaining, which proved too rigid to allow for political solutions and thus inefficient with respect to the task of providing for joint-decision making by the Council and the Parliament.
1 Interinstitutional relationships in the budgetary field have been investigated, among other, by Laffan (2000) , Lindner (2006) , Régnier-Heldmaier (1994) .
In particular, the paper complements Lindner's (2006) analysis of the opportunistic strategies of the Parliament in the 1980s. Alternating offers between institutions requires that each institution finds an internal political agreement, which can be more or less difficult to obtain depending on many factors (preferences, coalitions, voting rules) , and that it accepts to redraft it at any stage of the procedure. As it is difficult and burdensome to change the internal agreement, each institution tends to stick to its initial position: the particular procedure chosen for the budget exasperates this tendency and makes dominant those strategies insisting on each actor's preferred allocation. It is because of this setting, that the most constrained authority, the Parliament, resorted in the 1980s to the opportunistic exploitation of those provisions or ambiguities in the Treaty that could enlarge its competences, i.e. the indeterminacy concerning the list of non-compulsory expenditures and the calculus of the Maximum Rate of Increase.
The solutions to the shortcomings in the procedural design were found in a formal change of rules (the institution of the Financial Perspectives and of the Interinstitutional Agreement) and in the gradual development of a set of informal institutions, including best practices for negotiations and informal occasions for political bargaining. Thus, informal institutions have been not only a mechanism for equilibrium selection, as in Farrell and Héritier (2003) , but also a corrective device to the institutional setting of strict non-cooperative bargaining. However, although they remedy to procedural difficulties, informal institutions are also a channel to accommodate pressures for major changes: at the same time, they grant procedural stability and prevent those far-reaching reforms that the institutional design would require.
Non-cooperative bargaining between the Parliament and the Council is also the backbone of codecision, the legislative procedure. Again, shaping intergovernmental relationships by means of an infinite-horizon alternating offers bargaining implied interinstitutional difficulties and the need to develop informal institutions: the former experience with the budgetary procedure and the interinstitutional contacts so far developed then helped the Council to accept the political role of the Parliament and improved the operational working of codecision.
In the 2007 Treaty a modified version of codecision substitutes for the current budgetary procedure. We argue that this does not represent a substantial innovation, as codecision shares with the current budgetary procedure the same design of an alternating offers bargaining game between institutions. The limits of this procedural design are recognized by the Reform Treaty, which institutionalizes the role of informal institutions and reinforces the Commission's role as a mediator.
Informal institutions will be called to intensively assist the working of the new budgetary procedure, also because budgetary codecision is shorter than the legislative process and there are fewer possibilities for amendments. This will make essential, in advance of the first reading, to clearly state the political priorities of each institution and to reinforce the mechanisms of informal dialogue at an early stage.
Comparing the current and the reformed procedures, we also find that there are some changes in the interinstitutional balance of power. In particular, more scope for action is given to the Commission; opting-out is possible for both the Council and the Parliament in Conciliation, but it is easier for the Council; the enlargement of the competences for both the Council and the Parliament formalises what is currently their political say in informal negotiations and, on balance, seems to favour the Council. We are sceptical of the Parliament's enthusiasm for the provision that assigns it the possibility to disregard the joint text rejection by the Council and to reinstate its previous amendments after conciliation: it does not sanction the "Parliament's dominant position" in the budget (European Parliament, 2008) , but it is simply functional to guarantee that the text approved in conciliation by the delegates of the Parliament and Council is not repudiated by their parent bodies.
In the analysis we try to combine an interpretation of the formal decision-making rules and of their de facto operation and we try to investigate how institutions have responded to the formal rules imposed on them. For this purpose we start with a formal analysis of the Treaty rules and try to analyse which elements in their design have been responsible for the operative choices of the institutions. In this sense we adopt for the budgetary issues, the intermediate approach that Burns, (2003) , Rasmussen (2003) and Rittberger (2000) have employed for interpreting legislative codecision, combining the analysis of the strategic interactions among actors and elements of the de facto interinstitutional practice.
The analysis begins by briefly sketching the evolution of the budgetary procedure (section 2) and the budgetary conflicts of the 1980s (section 2.1). Section 3 provides a description of the formal rules for deciding the budget and of the de facto working of the procedure. The solutions to the budgetary conflicts are discussed in section 4. The formal rules that govern legislative codecision are presented in section 5. The final part summarises the novelties for the EU finances introduced by the 2007 Reform Treaty (section 6) and presents some conclusions (section 7).
The common pool problem and its solution in the EC Treaty
The political economy literature has much stressed the role of institutions in dealing with the common pool resource problem which affects fiscal and budgetary issues: deficit bias, overspending, lack of transparency. The response provided by the literature (Alesina and Perotti 2004; von Hagen et al. 2002) suggests the introduction of strong institutionalised constraints or a strong minister for finance, who represents the interests of all taxpayers and ensures that the budget 6 reflects the true cost to the public. Both aspects contribute to better governance of the budget and to higher centralization of the decision-making process, which seems to be correlated with better budgetary outcomes (von Hagen 1992; Alesina et al. 1999 ).
In the EU budgetary politics, the first issue to solve is which institutional level (intergovernmental or supranational) is entrusted of the common pool problem and in which degree.
The second issue concerns the consequences of the common pool problem, which are different from those related to the national budgets. In the EU, the common pool problem can not produce a deficit bias, as the Treaty prescribes that the budget must always be in balance and revenues automatically adapt to the level of the expenditures. However, the commons encourage overspending demands both from the member States, trying to minimise their net payments, i.e. to increase those items of expenditure from which they benefit more, while keeping their share of financing as small as possible, and from the European Parliament, enjoying the unique position of gaining credit from budgetary expansions, while not being associated to the related costs (Enderlein and Lindner 2006) .
In this contribution we focus on the first issue, while we do not touch the allocation issue, which has been extensively analysed in the literature (Baldwin, 2005; Baldwin et al., 1997; Blankart and Koester, 2008; Kauppi and Widgrén, 2005; Nava, 2000; Strasser, 1991) .
The Treaty of Rome initially entrusted the budgetary problems only to the intergovernmental level of cooperation. All decision-making power over the annual budget was bestowed on the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament's role was limited to consultation (ex art. 203 TEC). This first budgetary procedure was different from the ordinary consultation procedure, (Art.
250 TEC) employed for the ordinary legislation: in fact, the preliminary budget draft prepared by the Commission was not considered a legislative proposal, but a sui generis act which disappeared when the Council adopted the budget draft. Thus the Commission's right to propose a preliminary draft did not correspond to an effective agenda-setting power. The budget was always regularly approved during the 1970s, as the request for qualified majority voting in the Council avoided the problems that ordinary legislation met because of the application of the Luxembourg compromise and of the unanimity rule.
The Luxembourg Treaty (1970) and the Brussels Treaty (1975) modified the original outline, upgrading the power of the Parliament to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Community.
The access of the Parliament to the common pool problem increased the complexity of the decisionmaking process, which only apparently mimics the national budgetary procedures, where a Minister for finance prepares the draft budget and two Chambers discuss and amend it. The new set-up (Art.
272 TEC) provides for a draft budget prepared by the Commission and for two readings by the budgetary authorities. However, the role of the Commission cannot be compared to the role of a minister for finance, as, although it assists the whole procedure, has information advantages and forwards compromise proposals, its formal institutional role ends with the submission of the preliminary draft budget: in principle, the budgetary authorities are not obliged to take the (Bangemann, 1979) . When this acceptance failed, a prolonged period of interinstitutional difficulty began (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) : "the inability of Parliament and Council to agree upon a joint budget started to become a norm" (Lindner, 2006, p. 58 The literature (Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006) ascribes the conflicts between the Parliament and the Council to a number of reasons:
i. the reluctance of the Council to a real sharing of decision-making power, the substantial autonomy of the Parliament with respect to the member States and its desire to consolidate its institutional role;
2 The Council always insisted on the superiority of legislative acts: "prerequisite of any budgetary act was, in the eyes of the Council, the existence of a legislative decision that introduced a legal base for the expenditure decision" (Lindner 2006, p.49 v. the different preferences of the actors. The Parliament is more pro-integrationist, favours larger budgets and is also more interested in institutional building;
vi. a different sensitivity to failure (i.e. to budget rejection), lower for the Parliament, whose members face less pressure from the electorate and their national governments than the representatives of the member States in the Council (Pollack, 1997; Farrell and Héritier 2003) .
Some of these elements should not per se provide for reasons of conflict. Incompleteness in the rules specification is often unavoidable and it is usually corrected ex post when the procedure is applied: this is especially true with texts, such as the EU Treaties, that use relatively broad language (Farrell and Héritier 2003) . However, in the case of the EU budgetary procedure this indeterminacy was exploited by the Parliament, that adopted opportunistic interpretations of the treaty provisions on the expenditure classification and the Maximum Rate of Increase. The Parliament thus aimed at strengthening its power and at influencing the legislative domain from which it was excluded until 1987 (Laffan 1997) . Lindner (2006) shows how the Parliament's recourse to an opportunist interpretation of the Treaty improved its payoffs in the strategic one-shot game with the Council, modelled as a Battle of Sexes. We complement this interpretation, arguing that the particular decision-making procedure chosen by the Treaty is to be added to the reasons explaining the Parliament's opportunism and the escalation of interinstitutional conflicts.
The procedure design as a reason for interinstitutional conflict
The budgetary procedure is designed in the Treaty as a non-cooperative alternating-offers bargaining game (Figure 1 ). The Commission has responsibility for preparing a preliminary draft budget, which is submitted to both authorities for a first reading. The Budget Council establishes at qualified 5 It has been difficult for the Parliament to work out alliances with Member States in the Council on spending priorities. In the procedure for the 1987 budget, the first after the Iberian accession, the Council had difficulties in approving the draft budget (1 st reading), because of the blocking minority of the Southern countries, which demanded an increase in non-compulsory expenditure. Intergovernmental compromise found a solution by creating a reserve for unforeseeable events related to the Southern enlargement and by granting financing to the Integrated Med Programme: this broke the minority coalition and the draft budget was approved. When the Parliament (1 st reading) proposed significant increases in non-compulsory expenditures, it did not managed to raise a minority blocking in the Council to prevent the rejections of its amendments. The Council accepted amendments only up the Maximum Rate of Increase.
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ii. The formal structure of the procedure in the Treaty provides neither for pre-play communication, not for focal arbitrators. In neither case, the role of the Commission amounts to more than drafting the preliminary proposal and facilitating the discussions. This institutional disadvantage does not make it irrelevant, however it limits its room for manoeuvre and the possibility to influence the final outcome.
iii. The negotiated agreement is enforceable and, as such, it is protected against the players' reneging on their decisions.
iv. The budgetary decisions are taken in a setting of repeated interaction between the Parliament and the Council.
We simplify the analysis assuming that EU institutions act strategically as unitary actors 6 , that the Parliament aims at increasing its role in the decision-making process and that the Council is mainly oriented towards maintaining the existing levels and distribution of the expenditure. We skip the details of decision-making inside each institution: however, we are well aware that the greater are the difficulties of reaching an internal agreement on a draft, the greater will be the difficulties of modifying this position in the development of the procedure. This hysteresis effect creates a rigidity in the alternating offers setup: it is far more difficult for institutions than for individuals to alternate offers, because institutions must internally renegotiate their positions and this can be politically complicated or impossible. Therefore, institutions tend to stick to their first offer. Differently from the ordinary games of this type (Ståhl, 1972) , in both cases at stage n the last player's refusal to accept the (n-1) offer does not entail a zero payoff, but the possibility to reinstate his own previous (n-2) offer. Thus, if the Council at its second reading does not accept the modifications to compulsory expenditures voted by the Parliament, it can reinstate x CE 1 , the proposal voted at its first reading. The only possibility for the Parliament to influence the decision of the Council is to make an offer which the Council strictly prefers over its own original proposal: the same holds true for the Council. However, strategies insisting on each part's preferred allocation are dominant. In this non-cooperative setting, there is no incentive for either player to offer the counterpart more than his own preferred allocation.
As a matter of fact, the preferred allocation of the Parliament is bounded by the number of expenditures classified as non compulsory and by the calculus of the Maximum Rate of Increase: it would eagerly accept an higher offer, i.e. more expenditure items classified as non-compulsory or a higher Maximum Rate of Increase. However, the Council has no interest to such an offer, as this would imply reducing the number of compulsory expenditure items or accepting to increase the budget. Knowing that the counterpart has no incentive to offer more than what is granted by its own allocation-insistent strategy, each institution will stick to its own preferred position. The resulting budget will combine x No real opting-out clause is provided to the bargaining. The Parliament has the right to finally reject the overall budget (at absolute majority of members and 2/3 of votes) and to ask the Commission to provide for a new proposal: this is de fact interpreted as a re-draft of the second reading proposals of the Council and is submitted to both institutions for a third reading that the Treaty does not regulate. However, this is not a real outside option for the Parliament, because it is not a definite commitment of the Parliament to taking no further part in the negotiation. As the budget is essential to the EU functioning and to maintain continuity in the services it finances, the recourse to the budget rejection only delays its approval and is a sign of the Parliament's political discontent: thus the procedure is extended until the budget is finally adopted. Therefore the probability that the offer of the Parliament to the Council may, if rejected, be final, does not represent the power of commitment of the Parliament and does not substantially influence its relative share in the agreement, as it would be in a standard alternating offers game 8 . The weakness of the opting-out strategy in obtaining significant results is shown in ). This move is aimed at asserting the Parliament's institutional role but prevents the final adoption of the budget, as imposed by the ECJ ruling.
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Solving the budgetary deadlocks: formal and informal institutional changes
The exasperated budgetary deadlocks of the 1980s escalated so much that they would have however, its opposition did not last long and compliance with the Interinstitutional Agreement has continued to be its dominant strategy also during the annual budgetary procedure 11 . The main reasons that could account for the Parliament's compliance are its inability to radically change a decision taken by member States at unanimity and the loss of reputation and of mutual reliance that non-compliance would entail in its repeated interactions with the Council. As a matter of fact, the Parliament's threats to opt out 12 aimed substantially at extracting concessions on the annual 10 The Commission is not the agenda-setter, as the European Council acts as a sovereign body and can radically change its draft. However, the Commission can decisively orientate the decision, by preparing focal points for discussion and bargaining and, until the last renewal of the Financial Perspectives when this role was taken by the Presidency, by acting as a mediator. budgetary discipline (opinion exchanges on the financial priorities, concert on compulsory expenditures): the Parliament was ready to offer the Council "budget peace in exchange for political territory" (European Parliament, 1993) . On the other hand, the Council proved to be more accommodating to the requests for institution building than to the requests for increases in the expenditure lines 13 .
The institutional role of the Parliament was consolidated also by informal institutionbuilding, namely by the emergence of stricter and more timely budgetary cooperation: "[Budgetary conflicts] had put to the forefront the fact that the procedures established in the Treaty were too rigid to consolidate a political dialogue and that this latter had to be built in more informal meetings" (Bangemann, 1979, p. 177 -own translation) . Since 1975 the Council had taken the habit to receive a delegation from the Parliament before its first and second reading: this first negotiation forum evolved into the current four trialogues and two conciliation meetings 14 that are not regulated by the Treaty, but that have tuned the budgetary procedure according to joint decision-making modes. The Parliament obtained that these modes were given first official recognition in the 1993
Interinstitutional Agreement.
These habits of cooperation outside the formal procedure are sustained by repetition and trust and have made less relevant the precise assignment of competences and the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures. As a consequence, the Council has slowly and with considerable reservation come to terms with the presence of the Parliament in this policy field (Laffan, 1997, p. 89 ) and the Parliament has gradually, although informally, extended its political competence over the whole budget (Enderlein et al. 2005) . We conclude on the relevance of informal institutions (Goodin, 2000; Farrell-Héritier, 2003) , showing in detail how the particular formal setting chosen in the Treaty invited their emergence to avoid deadlock situations. Lindner (2006) this can be ascribed to the different time horizons of the institutions. The Parliament pursues a long-term strategy of institutional contestation against the Council which is more interested in short-term distributive outcomes. The difference in time horizons allows for a compromise that grants the Council distributive gains and the Parliament some institutional advantages. 
Interinstitutional trialogue on priorities and two conciliation meetings on CE
Commission preliminary draft
The draft budget presents a total increase of 4%, substantial margins under the headings for internal policies, external actions and administration, expenditure increases only for structural actions: X 0 . iii. The Commission can modify its original proposal at every stage of the procedure until the Conciliation Committee is convened and plays a formal 'gate-keeping' role (Rasmussen, 2003) , as the Council can include amendments of the Parliament by qualified majority, if they are approved by the Commission, while it need unanimity, if the Commission rejected them. However, the Commission cannot directly control the procedure, in the sense that it cannot persuade the legislators to adopt its own proposals: its main influence is exerted on the tabling and adoption of amendments and compromise texts (Rasmussen, 2003) 17 .
Conciliation meeting
15 Codecision has been extensively studied by rational choice institutionalists, who analyze the distribution of power and the strategic interactions among actors, often employing spatial modelling: among others, Widgrén (2003 and , Crombez (1997 and , Tsebelis (1994 and , Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) , Steunenberg and Dimitrova (1999) , Selck (2006) . A different perspective is provided in empirical accounts with detailed case studies: Shackleton (2000) , Corbett (2000 and , Corbett et al. (2003a and 2003b) , Burns (2002 and , Rasmussen (2003) . 16 The bargaining inside the Conciliation Committee has been modeled in different ways in the literature: as a bilateral bargaining (Napel and Widgrén 2003) , as an ultimatum game, with either the Council (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 1999) or the Parliament (Crombez 2000) making the take-it-or-leave-it proposal, and as a symmetric alternating offers bargaining with multiple rounds Widgrén 2003 and . Selck (2006) provides for an empirical test of some of these models.
17
The literature is divided on the relevance of the Commission's role in codecision. Rational choice institutionalists deem that the poor formal powers assigned to it make it irrelevant (Crombez, 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001) ; some pratictioners also deem that the consolidation of the relationships between Parliament and Council in conciliation has excluded the Commission from effective decision-making (Shackleton, 2000) . On the contrary, Burns (2002, and and Rasmussen (2003) state that the Commission's weakness is overstated and empirically analyse the channels through which the Commission has formally and informally influenced legislation in codecision.
iv. As the number of rounds and the player who makes the last offer within the Conciliation Committee are not specified, it seems reasonable to consider the infinite-horizon version of the game. Rubinstein's (1982) result grants a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, which depends on the cost-of-time formulas and on the preference specification. Thus, in equilibrium, the game should end at the first round. Like the budgetary process, this formal framework had to be filled with practice (Farrell and Héritier, 2003) Widgrén (2003) and . 24 The actors' impatience also plays a role in the preference for a new draft. Rittberger (2000) finds that the Parliament is more patient than the Council in legislative codecision. The same could be said also for the budgetary process, due to the fact the Parliament is less interested in short-term distributive issues than in long-term institutional positions: "as long as EU expenditure and pressure from constituencies on MEPs remain low, the Parliament can be assumed to have a long time horizon and a strong interest in enhancing its institutional powers in the decision-making power" (Lindner, 2006, p.31) . However, in some instances (the 1987 budget), the Parliament conditioned its position on the budget to more important upcoming negotiations on the future EU financing and avoided displeasing the Council with rejection. This result entails some consequences. First, asymmetrically assigning the Parliament the possibility to disregard the joint text rejection by the Council and to reinstate its previous Besides, the Parliament's impatience is increased by the risk to new policies that follows from the absence of the budget and from the Commission enacting the provisional twelfths system. informal say on non-compulsory expenditures, but it loses the power to autonomously raise the compulsory expenditures. On balance, the Council seems to gain under the new provisions (see also Benedetto and Hoyland, 2007) , all the more if we take also into account that the core of the expenditure decisions is entrusted to the Multi-annual Financial Framework, where the Council is the agenda-setter.
CM
The enlargement of competences impinges also on the regime in the event that the budget cannot be definitively adopted before the beginning of the financial year. The Reform Treaty retains the system of the provisional twelfths (art. 315 TFEU). The Parliament loses the power to increase the current non-compulsory expenditures and gains the power to reduce the current compulsory expenditures.
In the Reform Treaty, the Commission is given the same power it enjoys in legislative decision-making. It prepares not more 'a preliminary draft' but 'the draft budget', which is more than a formal change: in the line of Burns (2003) we believe that this implies more agenda-setting power for the Commission, as it is much harder for the budgetary authorities to modify the draft, once it has been formally published. Besides, the Commission can amend its own proposal until the Conciliation Committee is convened, which facilitates its role as a mediator between the Parliament and the Council. Its role is strengthened also in the Conciliation Committee and in the informal institutions (art. 324 TFEU). This should provide the Commission the opportunity to better exert its influence in formal and informal negotiations and it should avoid that the Commission's scope to act be reduced by the budgetary authorities' willingness to avoid mediators and to talk to each other directly.
The role of informal institutions is going to be enhanced by the Reform Treaty procedure.
Budgetary codecision is shorter than the legislative process and the importance of the first readings is increased: this implies that there are fewer possibilities for amendments and that amendments adopted at first reading will not be corrected by one single authority alone, but will be examined in conciliation by both authorities. This shorter process will make essential, in advance of the first reading, to clearly state the political priorities of each institution and to reinforce the mechanisms of informal infra-institutional and interinstitutional dialogue at an early stage, so that conciliation can be adequately prepared. As in legislative codecision, the need of trialogues and informal contacts at early stages creates new agenda-setting power for the Parliament and enhances its bargaining position.
The role of the current trialogues, and consequently the limits of the formal alternating-offers procedural design, are explicitly recognized by the Reform Treaty (art. 324 TFEU). Budgetary trialogues are convened on the initiative of the Commission, whose role as a mediator is reinforced.
Besides, the Presidents of the budgetary authorities are encouraged to take all the necessary steps to promote consultation and the reconciliation of the positions. This provision reinforces the general duty of sincere cooperation between the institutions by creating what is practically an obligation for the institutions to consult one another (European Parliament, 2008a) . The explicit recognition of the role of informal institutions is evidence of an 'iterated process of constitutional change' (Farrell and Héritier, 2003) , in which the new provisions are the product of previous informal rule-making.
Informal institutions are therefore called to intensively assist the working of the new budgetary procedure. Their mitigating role should however be counted among the reasons 26 that have prevented a more thorough institutional budgetary reform: along the years, they have accommodated much of the pressure for change, by granting an escape to the strict non-cooperative setting designed by the Treaty.
Conclusions
Legislative codecision and the current budgetary procedure are generally given different appreciation: while codecision is generally praised as efficient, the budgetary procedure is normally disregarded as obsolete and complicated. However, they share a common root: they both are designed as alternating offers bargaining games, which is the peculiar way chosen in the EU to reconcile national sovereignty and supranational authority. Early in their application, both procedures caused interinstitutional difficulties, misunderstandings and deadlocks. Explanations for this are provided by a consolidated literature, but an inbuilt reason lies also in the non-cooperative nature of the bargaining games, that exasperates the interinstitutional tensions, and in the difficulty that institutions have in applying the alternating offers setup: it can be politically too complicated for institutions to change their internal agreements on a draft in order to accept the counterpart's amendments.
Part of the solution to the above procedural problems has come from the mitigating role of early and continuous negotiation entrusted to informal institutions, as argued also by Goodin (2000) , Farrell and Héritier (2003) and Shackleton (2000) . By means of informal negotiation, the Parliament and the Council have been able to change the decision-making process from the non-cooperative alternating offers bargaining prescribed by the Treaty into cooperation and the search for compromise. Informal institutions have played, however, an ambiguous role: although they could circumvent the difficulties of decision-making, they also provided an escape to more radical changes in the assignment of institutional roles and have delayed reforms. The budgetary procedure has certainly benefited from the presence of trialogues and conciliation meetings: however, they have diluted the spur to a deeper involvement of the Parliament in the core of the budgetary decisions.
The 2007 Reform Treaty does not change much the current combination of national sovereignty and supranational authority in the decision-making process. It does not substantially 26 Benedetto and Hoyland (2007) argue that the substantial maintenance of the status quo in the reformed budgetary process, is due to the fact that the Parliament gains in constitutional forms where it is a formal actor and unanimity is not required (the Convention), while it loses in a closed forum (the IGC) where it only attends the meeting and the voting rule is unanimity. Enderlein and Lindner (2006) argue that the present state of political integration has prevented the more radical changes of the decision-making processes for the EU finances.
change the Parliament's access to the core of the financial decisions, the Own Resources Decision and the Multi-Annual Financial Framework, which are strictly kept at intergovernmental level. The adoption of codecision for the budget and the formal upgrading of the Parliament to the role of equal co-legislator amount to the "consolidation of the rules which have been necessitated by practical constraints outside the Treaty machinery", as the European Convention had suggested (European Convention, 2003, p.12) . In particular, the role of informal institutions is formalized, thus explicitly recognizing their mitigating influence in the too strict design of the procedure. They will be all the more important, as the new procedure is shorter and thus requires trialogues and informal contacts at an early stage: this will be an opportunity fro the Parliament to creating new occasions to increase its influence in the agenda-setting.
Some shifts in the balance of powers occurs with the new procedure. The Commission gains some scope for action, as it is recognized a formal role in negotiations and during the readings. The
Council gains from the enlargement of competences on the expenditures and from the possibility to opt-out in conciliation more easily than the Parliament. The Parliament is not given a formal dominant position, as the provision that assigns it the possibility to disregard the joint text rejection by the Council and to reinstate its previous amendments after conciliation is simply functional to guarantee that the text approved in conciliation by the delegates of the Parliament and Council is not repudiated by their parent bodies.
The assignment of powers in the decision-making processes for the EU finances mirrors the present state of political integration, as Enderlein and Lindner (2006) suggest. This is not the end of the story, but it is the starting point for new interactions between the budgetary authorities, which obey not only a formal procedural design, but also those informal rules of decision-making, which, since the first budgetary procedure in 1970-75, have blurred and modified the original formal outline. To the working of the current trialogues and of new informal spaces for negotiations is entrusted the possibility for the Commission and the Parliament to build intensive interinstitutional dialogue with the Council and stronger bargaining positions. As in the past, this will probably be, in the future, the basis for redefining relationships among institutions.
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